Sometimes this has taken the form of transnational campaigns for action to defend the motherland, as in the campaign to defend the Japanese occupied but Chinese-claimed Diaoyutai/Senkaku archipelago that was revived during the 1990s.
As opponents of the CCP regime have discovered that nationalism constitutes a powerful criticism for an authoritarian regime that legitimates its rule in increasingly nationalistic terms, even the websites of organisations such as the United Democrats of Hong Kong have promoted causes such as the 'defend the Diaoyutai' movement. Also symptomatic of this symbiotic relationship between democracy and nationalism in Chinese politics is the way that one of the main features of the 'VIP Reference' website, set up by Chinese students in the USA and Canada at the time of Tiananmen to disseminate news information in Chinese cyberspace, is a virtual museum of the atrocities committed by the Japanese during the Nanjing Massacre of 1937. 4 It is in this context of a rapidly expanding and politicised Chinese cyberspace that one of the most interesting political movements on the Internet occurred in the summer of 1998. The trigger was the riots the riots that swept Jakarta on 13-15 May 1998, in the wake of the Asian financial crisis. Investigations by human rights groups soon began to reveal that a disproportionate number of the victims of violence that had occurred were ethnic Chinese Indonesians, singled out as part of a what looked like a systematic campaign of persecution in which the military and police authorities were complicit. 5 What caused particular indignation was that many of the victims had been ethnic Chinese women, of all ages, who had been subjected to gang rape, often in front of their families. 6 Demonstrations by ethnic Chinese groups in the various southeast Asian states, Hong Kong and Taiwan, and as far away as Australia and the United States quickly followed. 7 Mainland China was the stark exception, with demonstrations remaining conspicuously absent. However, as rumours of more planned atrocities appeared on the Internet during the run-up to Indonesian Independence Day, 17 August, demonstrations did finally take place in Beijing. These culminated in a march to the Indonesian embassy by students from Peking University.
Through analysing messages posted on BBS pages from correspondents at Peking
University between August and September 1998, this article argues that the Internet provided an important medium in bringing the 17 August demonstration about. 8 First of all it provided the conduit for disseminating information about what was going on in Indonesia. Equally important was that the Internet also provided a channel for publicising information about the organisation of the demonstration in Beijing and news about how the attitude of the authorities to the movement. Most significant for Chinese politics, though, was the way in which the internet became a site for expressing dissent by calling into question the nationalist credentials of the CCP after the Beijing authorities refused to grant permission for the demonstration to take place.
Dissemination of information from abroad
In the months following the May atrocities, many BBS correspondents complained that the Chinese press itself had not kept them informed of events in Indonesia. They managed to supplement the limited coverage inside the PRC, however, by the posting of large numbers of detailed bulletins and analyses from web sites outside the country. Chinese translations appeared from agencies such as the Associated Press, Agence
France Press, Reuters, and the Voice of America as well as from the press in Taiwan and Hong Kong. The websites of major Indonesian newspapers such as Republika, Suara Pembaruan, and the Indonesian Antara News Agency, were also available for scrutiny. Thanks to access to such web sites, surfers inside mainland China could stay informed as events unfolded in Indonesia.
In-depth analysis and discussion on the position of the ethnic Chinese in Indonesian society was also provided by the transmission of Chinese versions of long articles from the Indonesian press. These included moving descriptions of the identity crisis that had been forced on the Chinese-Indonesians by the atrocities and the way that their faith in Indonesian tolerance and integration had been destroyed. They also included criticism of the way in which the Indonesian government used the media to make the Chinese scapegoats and portray them as selfish and unwilling to integrate, and how exclusion by the Malay majority has made such integration impossible. 9 Further evidence of the negative attitude of the Indonesian authorities was forthcoming in reports of statements by Indonesian officials, such as the speech by the mayor of Jakarta, H. Andi S. Abdullah, who, on 18 May, told a meeting of Chinese-Indonesians that they should 'learn a lesson' from the events, namely that they should not use money to buy their way out of community responsibilities, not pretend to be Muslims and not keep themselves apart from the community. 10 The international press, too, were criticised for the way in which they implied the Chinese-Indonesians were in part responsible for their own fate because of their economic success, which they had never implied in cases like Rwanda and the Balkans. China to the end, of course the Chinese are the greatest race in the world, Chinese culture will ultimately spread to the world, I firmly believe it.' 16 Information about how to make successful attacks was disseminated by internet users who claimed to be working on internet security, 17 as were notices telling surfers which Indonesian sites had been blacked out so that they could take a look for themselves.
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Apart from hacking, BBS pages also provided a space within which individuals could express the distress and anger they experienced after reading news of atrocities. Indonesian say that the first safe haven abroad that he would send his children to was not the Chinese motherland, but the United States, 'that place that we like to call the world policeman, like to call the hegemonic power'.
19

Organising political action
As news of the Indonesian atrocities spread through Chinese cyberspace, the internet started to be used as part of efforts to try to organise in mainland China the kind of protests that had been held by Chinese groups abroad. The first sign that Peking University students were planning to hold a demonstration came on 10 August, when news was relayed on BBS sites that the campus research and student committees there had put up a poster to announce that they were applying for permission to demonstrate.
A notice also appeared stating that three student representatives had applied for permission at the local branch of the Public Security Bureau, only to be told to make a more formal application to the Beijing City Public Security Bureau instead. 20 News was also relayed that a representative of the Peking University Communist Youth League had attended a meeting of between 100 and 200 students, and promised to tell them if the organisation would support a demonstration after he had made a report.
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News of how the authorities were reacting to other demonstrations did not give the organisers much room for optimism, however. One report told how plainclothes police had filmed a demonstration at the Indonesian Embassy on 10 August held by some 200
Beijing citizens, including known dissidents. 22 Another correspondent reported that staff at multinational companies such as IBM, Motorola and Oracle, who had been following the Indonesian events on the web, had been refused permission to deliver a letter to the Indonesian embassy. Although the police had expressed sympathy with the would-be demonstrators, the Foreign Ministry had blocked their request, on the grounds that Indonesia was facing a difficult time in its domestic and foreign affairs. 23 An ominous sign that the Peking University authorities would also try to prevent any protest appeared when news was posted on the internet that the triangular area of the campus where students hold meetings and put up posters, was being filled up with mounds of 'rotten' books and letters praising the handling of the floods that were sweeping the country that summer. 24 Most worrying for the Peking students, though, was a BBS report that appeared on 15 August informing them that leaders of a demonstration from neighbouring Qinghua University had been dispersed before it started, leaving only around 40-50 students to take part. Indignant responses were also made to any questioning of the seriousness of the students to march. 'Of course we are going!' exclaimed 'hejie'. I have even prepared the banners. (Only I do not know how many will turn up on the day). Never mind, go direct or go straight to the South Gate of Peking University and it will be OK'. 'The students might be young', agreed 'cdt', 'but they are also brave', adding the comment in reply to sceptics, 'I worry that one day I might not be able to stop myself having your kind of feelings. What is the difference between that and being dead?'
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The worst fears of the students were confirmed when the day of the planned protest, 17 August, finally arrived. News quickly spread by Internet that a notice announcing that permission to march had not been granted had been pinned up on campus. The refusal had been justified by the excuse that the country was preoccupied with efforts to control the devastating floods of that summer, and that a demonstration might also provoke the Indonesians to commit more atrocities.
even worse was that an AP cable from Jakarta appeared on the internet on 17 August which reported that the PRC government had actually agreed to give medical aid worth US$ 3 million to Indonesia and extend US$ 200 million of export credit. 29 Despite the ban on the protest, however, one-line messages continued to appear on the morning of 17 August, encouraging people to participate and to pass on the word to those who did not know. 'Blood has already flowed', exclaimed 'nobody!abc'. 'Crying out is no help. Everyone with a conscience, take your courage, the students need your support!!!!!!!! This evening some students have already been interrogated by security and forced to promise they will not demonstrate. The atmosphere at PKU is extremely tense, people are being "looked for" everywhere. This then is our government.'
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The following day first-hand accounts of how the demonstration had been frustrated began to appear. One correspondent described how he had woken early and made his way to the Triangle to find a mere handful of students there. When he proceeded to the meeting place at the South Gate, he was confronted by plainclothes policemen who told him to forget about demonstrating and to go and do some studying instead. He had another look at 9.00am and saw that nobody was around, and that the Qinghua 'second line' had also collapsed into nothing. 31 Another correspondent did get to the embassy, only to discover that building work was being carried out opposite. About 50 students were quietly sitting some distance away, behind a line of police, looking more like victims of an anti-pornography campaign than righteous demonstrators. Pedestrians were not permitted to pass, and cyclists were not allowed to stop. 32 According to one account, the students did apparently hold negotiations with the police and the campus authorities at a military-police hospital near the embassy, at which they complained that it was useless to try to use official channels. Four of them had finally been allowed to deliver a protest letter, re-emerging from the embassy to applause from the public. When they produced a banner written in English, though, it had been rapidly confiscated. When people began to take to the streets after the Indonesian atrocities, that the CCP dictatorship could become the subject of criticism quickly became apparent.
Internet reports of the dissident demonstration on 10 August, for example, explained that the marchers had delivered a letter to the Indonesian embassy complained that
Beijing had responded weakly to the atrocities, instead of exerting firm diplomatic pressure on Jakarta and establishing reception centres on Chinese territory for refugees.
More obliquely, the letter also insisted that only democratic government could protect the rights of all citizens.
News of accusations that Beijing's response had been 'luke warm' also began to appear on the Internet as the Peking University demonstration was being organised. The official reasons for refusing permission began to be treated with contempt.
'Aiding with the floods is an obligation, demonstrating is our right', exclaimed 'ericlin'' on the day after the demonstration. 'The government has messed things up, when it wants your help then it has a warm and sincere face. When you want to say a little of your own opinion, then it becomes unfathomable and even wont let you talk. As the anger grew, the CCP's patriotism increasingly became the focus of overt criticism. 'Ah!' exclaimed 'dgione', 'The country is backward, the government is weak and the citizens are bitterly disappointed. Moreover, the BBSs are now being closed.
Why ask everyone to talk only about patriotism, when talking about love of the people leads to the closure of the BBSs? Is patriotism really so difficult? Is it that one can only give one's heart to patriotism when far away overseas?? The country is so big, at the same time as controlling the floods, cannot the rest of the citizens take part in international politics and express their emotions. It is really interesting. Perhaps most sensitive of all was that Taiwan began to be brought into the issue.
One lengthy article by a certain Zhang Weiguo, posted by 'moveon' with the comment 'a load of claptrap', contrasted the weak attitude taken by Beijing towards Indonesia with the strong stance it had taken towards Taiwan during the run-up to the island's first presidential election in March 1996. 47 Even more damming was the accusation that Taipei had taken a much stronger stance towards Jakarta, announcing on 20 August that in reaction to public outrage in Taiwan it had suspended negotiations with the Indonesians and the supply of 200,000 tons of rice.
ROC foreign minister Jason Hu, pointed out a correspondent claiming to be a Chinese political scientist in the United States, had also issued a five point statement of concern to the Indonesian representative in Taipei. In contrast, PRC foreign minister, Tang Jiaxuan, representing Beijing which was so fond of advocating 'great nationalism and that blood is thicker than water', was accused of giving a green light for the atrocities by issuing a statement when he visited Jakarta in April 1998 that stressed that the fate of ethnic Chinese Indonesians was a domestic affair for Indonesia to handle alone. The reason for this, claimed the political scientist, was the common 'Asian values' espoused by Jakarta and Beijing, according to which both regimes were prepared to use violence as a means of government and to trample on the human rights of their citizens.
The virtual reality of politics in cyberspace
It has been proposed above that, during the events surrounding the August 17 demonstration by Peking University students, the Internet was a useful conduit for allowing people in an authoritarian society to keep informed about developments abroad, organise political action and express dissent. However, to assess the true nature of this activity, we should remember that politics in cyberspace has its own distinct characteristics. First of all, much of the information that makes its way into 'virtual reality' is unreliable. For example, some of the pictures of atrocities against ChineseIndonesian women that were posted on a web site for overseas Chinese 49 turned out to be photographs of outrages committed elsewhere and at other times. 50 Yet it is perhaps precisely the ease with which virtual reality can be manipulated that makes it ripe for the politics of mobilisation. What has been shown above is how the object of such mobilisation rapidly changed from the situation in Indonesia to criticism of the CCP regime in the PRC itself.
How this manipulation of reality came about can be seen in the way that many of the accusations that were levied against the response of the PRC government to the Indonesian crisis were calculated to be highly embarrassing for the Party leadership, but did not actually have much relationship either to the historical sequence of events or to the complexity of the situation abroad. 51 The statement made by PRC foreign minister Tang Jiaxuan during his April visit to Jakarta, which was later criticised on the Internet, was certainly cautious. However, it was made in the context of an awareness of Indonesian historical sensitivities about the possibility of Chinese intervention. This has been freshly underlined in April 1994 when Jakarta had accused Beijing of reverting to its past meddling in Indonesian affairs after the PRC Foreign Ministry had made a statement of concern over violence against ethnic Chinese during riots in Sumatra.
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Despite this, as the situation deteriorated in Indonesia, the PRC Foreign Ministry did increase the strength of its statements in a carefully calibrated way, issuing a statement of concern on 14 May, 53 followed by a demand from Tang Jiaxuan that the Indonesian government should ensure the security of ethnic Chinese and find and punish those who had committed crimes against them.
In contrast to accusations made by BBS correspondents, the difference between Beijing's and Taipei's reactions to the atrocities was also quite small. The report on mass rapes did not appear until 8 July, and the shocking diary of Wei Wei An only appeared on the Internet at the end of July. Beijing responded to the reports with a Foreign Ministry statement of concern on 28 July, and foreign minister Tang Jiaxuan told his Indonesian counterpart at a meeting in Manila that his government was closely watching how the perpetrators of atrocities would be punished and the safety of ethnic Chinese and their property assured. When Taipei began to react with stronger measures, on the other hand, it was the ethnic Chinese Indonesians themselves who called for restraint out of fear that such actions might make their own situation worse. 54 An investigation mission sent from Taiwan soon found that rather than bold diplomatic gestures that might please domestic pressure groups in Taipei, what the ethnic Chinese
Indonesians wanted was more flexibility on allowing refugees to enter. 
Conclusion
There is now ample evidence to suggest that Chinese cyberspace has become an important political arena. Much has been written on the potential of the Internet to spread democratisation. 57 The idea that the increasing porosity of borders to information flows will lead to democratisation has even been an important assumption behind US foreign policy towards the PRC since the end of the Cold War. However, despite the presence of Chinese websites dedicated to democratisation, by far the most popular campaigns in Chinese cyberspace to date have been linked to nationalist themes.
The case of the reaction to the Indonesian atrocities examined here is but one case. claimed the Nanjing Massacre was a fabrication, public websites in Japan were also attacked. At one point, some 1,600 strikes were launched within the space of seven minutes against the Bank of Japan's computer system.
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One of the problems in assessing the impact of such activities in cyberspace is that the motives and identities of its authors can be obscure. During the hacking war between the two sides of the Taiwan Strait, for example, it was even suggested that the motives of hackers were not so much concerned with politics as the wish to prove which side possesses most technological prowess. Most difficult, however, is deciding the relationship between Internet activity and the attitudes and actions of the PRC state.
Regarding the organisation of demonstrations, for example, following the dispersal of the planned protest by Qinghua University students mentioned above, one BBS correspondent pointed out that the authorities might actually be encouraging people to rely on the web because it reduces the possibility of secret organisation.
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A more likely development than this is the increasing need for the state to align itself with the nationalistic outbursts that are becoming a regular occurrence in Chinese cyberspace. That the PRC state has found itself increasingly held hostage to an ideology that it has itself encouraged since the Tiananmen Massacre was evident when the authorities found themselves having to provide busses to ship demonstrators to the anti-NATO demonstrations held after the Belgrade bombing. There is plenty of evidence to indicate that the Internet played an important role in those events. It was via the Internet that news of the NATO attack was first spread. Aside from the street demonstrations that this triggered, there was also a massive burst of activity in cyberspace as views were posted on BBS sites, and information on how to hack into and disrupt foreign computer systems was spread. The reaction of the authorities this time was very different from their stance in the case of the Indonesian affair. Successful hacking attacks against United States government computers were reported with a degree of pride in party-controlled newspapers, which even printed addresses of US government websites. 63 Perhaps the final twist of irony, though, was that the very same Beijing municipal authorities that had tried to prevent autonomous protest activity following the Indonesian atrocities actually set up a special 'Sacred Sovereignty' website on which people were encouraged to express their outrage over the Belgrade bombing, and from where they could obtain the email addresses of NATO governments and political parties.
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In light of all of the above evidence, it seems safe to say that Chinese cyberspace is an increasingly important arena for nationalist activity. There are also indications that the state is finding it increasingly necessary to align itself with such activity rather than face the kind of embarrassment that was generated by its reaction to the Indonesian crisis. The state may not feel quite so vulnerable when it comes to promoting democracy, where it has already put on trial individuals accused of using the internet to subvert social order. 65 The state can, after all, claim with some consistency and a degree of public support that its dictatorship is necessary to maintain the stability necessary for economic development. When it comes to nationalism, however, political activity is much more difficult to suppress for a party whose claim to legitimacy is expressed increasingly in nationalistic terms. It is difficult to see, therefore, how any of the Internet laws and regulations that have been enacted in the PRC could be used to stifle nationalist activity in cyberspace.
This point is important to bear in mind when the spread of the Internet is so central to the process of 'globalisation'. From the examples looked at here, it would at least seem safe to conclude that there is no more reason to assume that the spread of the internet will lead to the spread of a particular liberal-democratic culture, any more than did the printed book. After all, as Anderson points out, print capitalism was one of the preconditions necessary for the age of nationalism to come about. 66 There is no obvious reason why Chinese cyberspace should not be just as amenable to the politics of nationalism. 
